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The nexus between external debt,
corruption and economic growth:
evidence from five SSA countries
Waliu Olawale Shittu, Sallahuddin Hassan and
Muhammad Atif Nawaz
School of Economics, Finance and Banking, Universiti Utara Malaysia,
Sintok, Malaysia
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of external debt and corruption on economic
growth in the selected five Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, from 1990 to 2015.
Design/methodology/approach – Panel unit root and panel cointegration tests are employed to test for
stationarity of the series and the long-run relationship, respectively. Fully modified OLS and dynamic OLS
techniques are also employed to examine the long-run coefficients of the variables of the model, as well as
panel Granger causality test, in order to examine the direction of causality among the variables.
Findings – The results indicate that there is a negative relationship between external debt and economic
growth, as well as a bi-directional causality between the two variables. The findings also indicate a positive
relationship between corruption and economic growth, as well as a uni-directional causality running from
economic growth through corruption.
Research limitations/implications – The study recommends that the governments of the selected
countries should address the menace of rising external debt through the adoption of other sources of capital
for investment. Such include more openness of the economy for more capital, by easing restrictions on
genuine imports and exports of valuable goods and services. It also suggests that the issue of corruption be
tackled head-on, by such penalties that tend to make corruption less attractive.
Originality/value – While the relationship between economic growth and external debt, on the one hand,
and corruption and economic growth, on the other hand, have received considerable attentions, the trio of
external debt, corruption and economic growth have not been found combined in a model, to the best of the
authors’ knowledge. Also, the countries under consideration, who jointly account for about 47 percent of
the entire SSA countries’ stock of external debt, have not been jointly found in any recent panel studies
involving the selected variables.
Keywords Corruption, External debt
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Considering that the financing of development initiatives is particular to both developed and
developing countries, the focus on external debt is due to its vulnerability, which may result
in debt crisis. This is because of the inability of the developing countries’ reserve banks to
print foreign currencies required for external debt repayment, as well as the consequences of
transfer problem arising from the economies’ access to foreign resources, given that internal
borrowing only enhances domestic transfer of resources (Keynes, 1929).
In the areas of external finance, the IDS (2017) reports that external debt stock of
low-income and middle-income economies declined 6 percent, from US$6.968tn in 2008 to
US$6.7tn in 2015. This arises from the net debt outflows in conjunction with year-on-year
exchange adjustments between the currencies in which external debt is denominated and
the US Dollar (US$). Based on the same reports, as of 2013, 27 African countries are among
the 36 countries classified as low-income. Most of these countries have been heavily
burdened by debts while their financial systems have been largely defective, thereby
creating problems in the course of servicing the debts obligations. The systems of economic African Journal of Economic andManagement Studies
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and social welfare have largely declined, while that of government has fallen drastically
(Megersa, 2015; Richards et al., 2003).
In Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, the level of aggregate external debt stood at US
$416.3bn in 2015, which was 4.05 percent increase from the 2014 balance; with interest
payment rising from US$3.8bn to US$9.3bn between 2010 and 2015. Out of the total debt
accrued to this sub-region of 46 countries, only 5 of them, namely, Nigeria, South Africa,
Malawi, Uganda and Kenya, accounted for 46.49 percent in 2015. The changes in the debt
stocks of these (selected) SSA countries between 2010 and 2015 are presented in Table I.
As presented in the table, the rise in debt stocks of the selected five SSA countries is
exorbitant, ranging from 69.9 percent in Malawi to 116.4 percent in Kenya. South Africa
recorded the lowest rise in stock of external debt, with an estimate of 27.2 percent increase.
However, the debt stock of South Africa alone is more than twice the total debt stocks of
the remaining four countries combined, between 2010 and 2015. This is an indication of the
extent to which these SSA countries heavily rely on external debts, while the average
infrastructural development necessary to attract both foreign direct and portfolio
investments are grossly inappropriate (World Bank, 2016).
Also in the World Bank (2016) reports, the SSA countries remain heavily indebted
despite the increased share of net financial inflows through portfolio investments. The net
inflow to Nigeria became negative due to the fall in international oil prices and the
simultaneous decline in the country’s macroeconomic prospects. This, in turns, creates
opportunity for South Africa as it results in increased investment into the country, which
saw the latter’s portfolio equity inflows rising to US$7.3bn—almost triple the 2014 level.
The net financial flows into Nigeria in 2015, for instance, fell (12.8 percent) to US$7,017m
from US$8,048 in 2010; rose marginally from US$415 to US$1,721 in the case of Uganda,
between 2010 and 2015; rose from US$430 in 2010 to US$4,393 in Kenya; rose from US$199
in 2010 to US$428 in 2015 in Malawi; and rose to US$20,582 in 2015 from US$5,607 in 2010.
Despite the increased debt accumulation and rising net financial flows into four of these
countries, with a decline in Nigeria, the average rate of growth still continuously declines
both for the countries with the rising financial flows, and for that with the falling flows.
In Figure 1, each of the graphs shows that while the stock of external debt keeps
trending upwards over the years—specifically as external debt rises—economic growth
keeps falling.
In the case of South Africa, however, the trends in economic growth and external debt
simultaneously rise and fall. This continuous rise in these SSA countries’ debt profiles may
lead to investment distortion when the debt is too high, as a result of investors’ predictions
that earnings from any project will be taxed away in the course of servicing the pre-existing
debt (Aguiar et al., 2009; Krugman, 1988). In other words, as the debt level rises in relation to
economic growth, the cost of financing and constraining investment increases since
creditors demand higher rates of interest in order to compensate the risk of default
(Greenlaw et al., 2013). These factors have high tendency to exacerbate the problem of
capital flight; this occurs when investors take out their domestic investment temporarily
Country Debt stock (2010) (million US$) Debt stock (2015) (million US$) Remarks (% increase)
Nigeria 15,484 29,029 87.5
Uganda 2,975 5,756 93.5
Kenya 8,848 19,148 116.4
Malawi 1,021 1,735 69.9









































and engage in short-term foreign investment until the situation of debt becomes favorable to
them, thereby retarding the growth rate of the economy (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2011).
The problem of foreign currency denomination may largely affect the economies of the
selected, as well as other SSA countries, among many other developing countries. This is as
a result of large presence of foreign currency which intensifies financial fragility, heightens
inflation rate (as in Kenya, from 2.09 to 9.14 percent; and Malawi, which recorded hike in
essential commodity prices, from 12.13 to 21.08 percent, between 2010 and 2015),
and decreases growth rate as a consequence of sub-optimal macroeconomic policies
(Dell’Erba et al., 2013; Panizza and Presbitero, 2014).
Furthermore, the various economic recovery and stabilization efforts have been largely
weakened by the declining growth rate, which is a consequence of heavy debts, on the one
hand, and corruption, on the other hand. This is shown by a large share of the region’s
resources which are either being used for debts servicing or are being misappropriated
instead of their being channeled into viable investment in both physical and human capital;
or even both (Richards et al., 2003). With the persistent level of corruption, the debt relief
programs would be a meaningless proposition, which may wipe out the old debts, but in
turn create a new impetus for further misappropriation, corruption and capital flight.
Corruption has been identified as a major impediment to growth and development as a
result of its impact of impeding economic growth; weakening the legal, economic and
political institutions of government; among others (Coupet, 2011; Lambsdorff, 2005).
Figure 2 shows the trend patterns of corruption (CORR) and economic growth (GDP) in
the selected SSA countries. The horizontal line explains the prevalence of corruption in these
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pervasive in these countries due to the constancy of occurrence as shown by the horizontal
graph. In fact, it has been identified as the main impediment to the growth of the countries,
as it forms one of the main issues of concern that impede growth and development. Also, the
pattern of economic growth shows upward trend, which explains that despite
the prevalence of corruption (which has practically become the norms in these countries),
the GDP still trends upwards for most of the periods. The rising GDP is connected to the
views of some economists, who argue that corruption, where it is pervasive, has tendency
to facilitate economic exchange by helping to overcome cumbersome regulations
(Huntington, 1968; Lambsdorff, 2005; Leff, 1964).
The objective of this research is basically to study the relationship among government
external debt, corruption and economic growth by estimating the magnitude, direction and
causal relationships among the variables in the selected five SSA countries. The relationship
between economic growth and external debt has received large attention in both theoretical
and empirical literature (see, for instance, DiPeitro and Anoruo, 2012; Megersa, 2015), as
does the relationship between corruption and economic growth (see, for instance,
Lambsdorff, 2005; Coupet, 2011). This study, however, combines the trio of external debt,
corruption and economic growth in a model, so as to examine the impacts of rising external
debt, and resources mismanagement on economic growth. This, to the best of our
knowledge, has not been captured in any recent panel analysis involving these variables in a
model. Also, the selection of the countries is based on their large sizes of economies, and the
fact that their external debt stock is about 47 percent of the entire SSA countries’ stock of
external debt; availability of sufficient literature to support the arguments, as well as data
availability for the period 1990–2015.
2. Review of related literature
The effective use of debt is expected to increase government investible capital on
infrastructure, which will enhance investment and increase the level of domestic economic
activities. Conversely, especially with years of experience in the third-world countries, most
of the debts incurred from both domestic and external, sovereign and private, sources have
largely not been put into judicious use as to foster the development of basic infrastructures
that attract investment and enhance growth (Richards et al., 2003; Stella and Chikaza, 2013).
In the studies carried out by Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) on public debt and long-run
growth, they took the sample of 118 economies, between 1961 and 2012. Employing the
common correlated effect mean group (CMG) and common correlated effect estimation
techniques, the authors obtained evidence of a statistically significant and positive long-run
relationship between debt and GDP. The error correction terms are also found to be
negative, significant and less than one, for each of the estimation techniques, which is



























































estimator in the short-run, however, the coefficient of debt is found to be statistically
significant and negative, which implies a negative relationship between debt and GDP.
The positive coefficient is in line with the studies conducted by Megersa (2015) and
Jayaraman and Lau (2009).
Furthermore, while analyzing the Laffer curve and debt-growth relationship in 22
low-income SSA countries, Megersa (2015) employed the pooled ordinary least squares
technique to estimate the secondary data obtained from 1990 to 2011. His findings reveal
that the effect of debt on GDP is significant and positive up to a certain threshold. Adegbite
et al. (2008) toed the line when they found that each of external debt and the interest
on external debt has a positive association with GDP for the periods under consideration.
They, therefore, conclude that external debt enhances GDP up to a certain point, after which
the effect on GDP becomes negative—implying its non-linear effect on economic growth.
In the same line, Jayaraman and Lau (2009) obtained that a higher level of debt promotes
economic growth. Using the fully modified OLS (FMOLS) technique to examine the effect
of external debt on GDP in six Pacific-Island economies, between 1988 and 2004, the authors
equally observe the existence of significant causal relationship running from external debt
through GDP in the short-run.
Similarly, Mohd Dauda et al. (2013), in their analysis of Malaysia’s external debt-growth
nexus, used quarterly data between 1991Q1 and 2009Q4, while employing the
auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) technique. Their findings reveal that external debt
accumulation is associated with a rise in Malaysia’s economic growth up to an optimal level.
Additional increase in external indebtedness beyond the optimal level, however, adversely
affects the country’s economy. The coefficient of interest on external debt is also found to be
both positive and negative.
On the contrary, in the static linear and non-linear models ( for the full sample analysis)
using the MG and CMG estimators, Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) found that
the coefficient of debt is significant and negative in relation to GDP. This is similar to
the findings of Megersa (2015), who obtained the coefficient of debt to be negative;
Adegbite et al. (2008), DiPeitro and Anoruo (2012), and DiPeitro and Anoruo (2012) studied
the impact of government debt and government size on economic growth in 175 countries,
between 1997 and 2008, using the traditional fixed and random effects (FE/RE) techniques.
While employing the OLS and generalized least squares techniques in the estimation of both
the linear and non-linear effects of external debt (EXDBT) on GDP in Nigeria, from 1975 to
2005, Adegbite et al. (2008) obtained that each of EXDBT and interest on external debt
(DEBTIN) has a significant and negative relationship with GDP.
Furthermore, Siddique et al. (2015) employed PMG, MG and dynamic fixed effect
techniques for heavily indebted poor countries, from 1970 to 2007. Their findings reveal that
the coefficient of EXDBT is significant and negative with respect to GDP, both in the
short-run and the long-run. Also in Abdullahi et al. (2016), using the ARDL technique in his
analysis of EXDBT effect on economic growth between 1980 and 2013, each of the
coefficients of EXDBT and DEBTIN has a significant and negative association with
capital formation in the short-run and long-run. In the same way, Fosu (1999) studied the
impact of EXDBT on 35 SSA countries’ economic growth between 1980 and 1990. Using the
OLS technique, he found evidence of a negative effect of the net outstanding debt on
economic growth, and that a negative correlation exists between government external debt
and investment.
In the corruption–economic growth relationship, Huang (2016) employed the bootstrap
panel Granger causality technique to incorporate both heterogeneity and cross-sectional
dependence across the 13 Asia-Pacific countries. Using panel data between 1997 and 2013,
the author found a significant and positive causality, which runs from CORR through GDP







































The author, however, does not go with the perception that corruption hinders economic
growth for all the 13 Asia-Pacific economies. Rather, he submits that grease the wheels
hypothesis is true for South Korea, and that governments’ result to anti-corruption policies
aimed at promoting economic development may not be effective. The increase in the
growth rate of Chinese economy is also found to increase corruption. Furthermore, Coupet
(2011) obtained a significant and positive relationship between CORR and GDP, using the
OLS technique in the case of the OECD countries, between 1960 and 1989. An explanation
given for the positive coefficient, according to Coupet (2011), is that efforts geared toward
getting rid of corruption result in opportunity costs, such that as developing economies
deploy resources toward uncovering and preventing corruption, there are positive, but
diminishing returns.
The above results are, however, in contrast to the studies conducted by Lambsdorff
(2005) on corruption and economic development, wherein he used the OLS and two-stage
least squares techniques, between 1970 and 1995. The result explains that a point increase
in the level of corruption, on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean), lowers
the level of productivity by 2–4 percent of GDP, while decreasing the annual (net) capital
inflows by 0.5 percent (of GDP). In the same manner, Ugur (2014) considered 327 estimates
of the direct effects of CORR on GDP from 29 primary studies. His findings are
heterogeneous as a result of different approaches to measuring corruption and economic
growth, method of estimation, country coverage and sample periods; while the primary
studies report negative effects. Also, Coupet (2011) in the same study, but for non-oil and
non-OECD countries, obtains that corruption negates the society’s welfare standard
through GDP and investment. This is as a result of significant and negative relationship
found between CORR and GDP, using both the linear and non-linear OLS estimation
techniques. The square of corruption is also found to have a significant and negative
relationship with GDP, implying a strong, negative (non-linear) relationship between
CORR and output per worker for the OECD countries.
The reviewed literatures infer that external debt-economic growth relation is
inconclusive, so that whatever the shape and form, it differs across economies in such a
way that the appropriate policies in one country may not be adequate in another. Similarly,
in corruption–economic growth nexus, the coefficient of corruption is negative for most of
the studies, even though some researchers argue the relationship to be positive based on the
prevailing economic and governance systems.
3. Methodology
The debt overhang hypothesis upholds that if debt exceeds an economy’s ability to repay,
given some future probabilities, the expected debt service will be an increasing function of
the economy’s level of output. As such, part of domestic investors’ returns are taxed away
by the existing foreign creditors; thereby distorting both domestic and foreign investment
and, therefore, economic growth (Claessens et al., 1996).
Similarly, the augmented Solow growth model, propounded in 1956 and adopted from
the studies conducted by Coupet (2011), modifies the growth model by incorporating the
impact of corruption on the level of productivity in order to measure its final effect on
economic growth.
Suppose an economy which concentrates on the production of a single commodity, with a
given neoclassical production function:
Yt ¼ Kat Hbt ½At rð ÞLt 1ab; (1)




































capital, respectively; At the multifactor level of productivity; Lt the hour of labor employed;
and ρ the corruption level, such that A'( ρ)o0.
If 0oαo1, 0oβo1 and α+ βo1, the production function is assumed to exhibit a
positive, yet diminishing marginal returns to labor and capital:
dK
dt
¼ SKY tdKKt and
dH
dt
¼ SHY tdHHt ; (2)
where the exogenous parameters are SH, SK, δH and δK, which represent the proportions of
income allotted to human capital investment, physical investment and depreciation rates of
human and physical capital, respectively. The population is assumed to be exogenously
determined, and defined as Lt¼Loent such that the rate of population growth is constant
over time, i.e. (dL/dt)/Lt¼ n2.
Also, if At represents the economy’s multifactor productivity, then:
At rð Þ ¼ ~Ategr;where 0prp1 and ~At ¼ Aoegt : (3)
Corruption is being incorporated into this model, which is assumed exogenous, and
deteriorates input productivity. This deterioration takes many forms, from the effects of
externalities to the diminished quality of inputs. The firm that pays a bribe in order to
avoid fines likely reduces its level of investment, and may also cause externalities
to several other firms. Similarly, when a high-ranking government official attempts
to provide public goods by engaging his unqualified cronies, it has a cost of reducing
productivity in the private sector (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998). Hence, the corruption
parameters, ρ and g, jointly influence the effects of corruption on multifactor productivity.
ρ measures the country’s overall corruption level, while g estimates the sensitivity of
corruption to the production function.
The conventional multifactor productivity, Ãt, is assumed exogenous and grows at
rate g; implying that: dAt/dρo0, while d2At/dρ2W0. Therefore, in the absence of corruption
(such that ρ¼ 0), Ãt¼At; a positive (or negative) value of ρ results in a situation where
corruption reduces (or improves) the multifactor productivity, since the value and sign
of g are instrumental in modeling the net effect of corruption on multifactor productivity.
In line with the debt overhang hypothesis and the modified-Solow theory, as well as
existing studies such as that of Lambsdorff (2005), Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) and Leff
(1964), the following model is specified in order to test the empirical relationships between
EXDBT, CORR and GDP:
GDP ¼ f EXDBT; GCF ; CORR; DEBTINð Þ; (4)
GDPit ¼ b0þb1 EXDBTit ; þb2 GCFit ; þb3 CORRit ; þb4 DEBTINitþeit ; (5)
where βi is the parameter representing the intercept and slope coefficients; GCF and
DEBTIN denote gross capital formation and interest on external debt, respectively, which
are selected as control variables based on their relationship with GDP and previous studies;
εit the stochastic term which captures the effects of other variables that are not included in
the model. It is a white-noise error term, whose mean is zero with constant variance and
covariance. The choice of these variables is premised on data availability. Here i represents
the cross-section (countries); and t is the time series (in years).
The secondary data sources are used in this study. The nature of the data is formed by
pooling the cross-section and time series data; composed of annual data on GDP, EXDBT,
gross capital formation (GCF), CORR and DEBTIN, for the selected SSA countries, between







































International Financial Statistics and Direction of Trade Statistics and World Bank’s World
Development Indicators and International Debt Statistics, while data on CORR are obtained
from the International Country Risk Guide.
The technique of unit root test, developed by Im et al. (2003) based on the Dickey–Fuller
procedure, is adopted in order to test the existence of panel cointegration by first examining
the stationarity of the data. The Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) statistic offers different
estimations for each of the cross-sections and permits different specifications in terms of the
residual variance, lag lengths and parametric values. The model of IPS–unit root test is:
DYi;t ¼ aiþriY i;t1þ
Xn
k¼1
jikDYi;tkþdi tþeit ; (6)
where Y denotes each of GDP, EXDBT, GCF, CORR and DEBTIN whose stationarity tests
are required in order to determine the presence of unit root.
After examining the stationary property of the data, the cointegration technique
developed by Pedroni (1999), which allows for considerable heterogeneity and uses the
residual estimates from the hypothesized long-run regression, will be employed to test
the long-run relationship among the variables. The long-run relation is of the form:
GDPit ¼ aiþditþb1EXDBTitþb2CORRitþb3DEBTINitþb4GCFitþeit ; (7)
where t¼ 1,…,T; i¼ 1,…,N; T denotes the number of observations over time; and N
represents the number of cross-sections in the panel. Also, αi denotes the fixed effects
parameter (member-specific intercept) such that it varies across individual cross-sections;
and δit denotes the deterministic time-trend, the coefficients of the slope (member-specific
time effect).
The integration of the series at first-difference, with time-trend, and the existence of long-
run relationship among the variables guide to the estimation of the long-run coefficients,
using the FMOLS and dynamic OLS (DOLS) techniques. These techniques, developed by
Pedroni (2001a), Phillips and Moon (1999), Saikkonen (1992) and Stock and Watson (1993),
are used to estimate the long-run relationship on a single equation estimators. FMOLS is
designed for making inferences in cointegration panels with heterogeneous dynamics, as the
cross-section increases even for panels with relatively short time series dimensions. It is also
aimed at addressing the problems of simultaneity bias, non-stationarity and endegoneity of
the regressors that is the main concern in panel analysis (Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004).
Similarly, DOLS method is a simple technique employed in estimating efficient estimator,
that is, asymptotic and removes the feedback in the cointegrating system. It encompasses
the enhancement of cointegrating regression with leads and lags of ΔXt so that the
consequential cointegrating equation error term is orthogonal to the overall history of the
stochastic regressor innovations.
































where the covariance matrix may be decomposed as Oi ¼ O0i þGiþGi , such that O0i is the
contemporaneous covariance matrix, while Γi the weighted sum of autocovariances.
Similarly, Ô
0






































The existence of cointegrating relationship only indicates the existence of long-run
relationship among the variables, but does not give detailed information regarding the
direction of causality. In order to examine the short-run and long-run causal relationship
among the variables, the study adopts the two-step procedure proposed by Engle and
Granger (1987). This test is used to examine the direction of causality among the
macroeconomic variables of the model. It is a method of investigating the causality between
two variables that are closely related. The null hypothesis for the test is that the lagged
values of, say X, do not explain the variation in another variable, Y.
It may be of interest to know, for instance if GDP is the variable that causes CORR
(GDP→CORR) or if it is CORR that causesGDP (CORR→GDP), where in either or both cases the
arrow is pointing to the direction of causality. This test supposes that the relevant information to
the variables prediction,GDP and CORR, is solely contained in the time series of these variables.




























rjGDPitjþU 4it ; (12)
such that U1it, U2it, U3it and U4it are assumed uncorrelated.
The two-variable causality assumption is known as “Bi-Directional Causality.”
This postulates that current GDP is related to past values of itself as well as that of
CORR and the current value of corruption is related to both its past values as well as the
past values of GDP (Engle and Granger, 1987; Gujarati, 2004).
4. Empirical analysis
Descriptive statistics
Tables II and III present the summary statistics both in the actual variable measurement,
and in the linearized measures of the units in billion in order to enhance efficient unit
comparison in terms of means.
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum SD
GDP 6.32E+10 4.17E+11 1.18E+09 9.95E+10
EXDBT 1.63E+10 1.17E+11 8.69E+08 2.14E+10
DEBTIN 1.449 8.351 0.018 1.732
GCF a 1.06E+10 7.98E+10 2.36E+08 1.85E+10
CORR 2.323 5.000 0.500 0.895









































The mean value is the average value of observations for each variable. As can be observed
from Tables II and III, each of the variables is fairly distributed across the mean value, as
the mean value in each case has relatively lower deviation from the standard deviation.
This means that each of the variable observations does not have wide deviation from the
average value; the standard deviation gives more accurate and comprehensive estimates
of dispersion because an outlier can largely overstate the range of observations. Similarly,
the minimum and maximum values describe each variable as it appears, in terms of the
lowest and highest values in each series. As such, the minimum observation, when
compared to the maximum observation gives the range of the observation value for each
of the variables of analysis.
Correlation analysis
The results of the correlation analysis are presented in Table IV. Given that correlation
measures the degree/extent of the relationship between two variables, it is a measure of
direction and not of magnitude.
As in Table IV, there exists a negative correlation between each of DEBTIN, EXDBT,
CORR and GDP; while GCF has a positive correlation with GDP. There is low degree of
substitution among the independent variables, given that each of the coefficient values is
less than 0.5. In the case of EXDBT and DEBTIN, the degree of substitutability is relatively
high. However, the a priori expectation is still observed since high DEBTIN largely
influences EXDBT in the same direction.
Panel unit root analysis
The results presented in Table V explain that each of the series has evidence of stationarity
only after the first-difference. This is evident from the fact that the probability value in
each case is less than 5 percent at both constant and constant plus trend conditions.
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum SD
GDP 23.634 26.755 20.890 1.646
EXDBT 22.789 25.485 20.583 1.228
DEBTIN −0.218 2.122 −4.018 1.185
GCF 21.826 25.102 19.278 1.601









EXDBT −0.201** 0.751 1.000
(0.025) (0.000) –
GCF 0.379*** 0.137 0.182 1.000
(0.000) (0.121) (0.038) –
CORR −0.336*** 0.343 0.341 −0.051 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.570) –







































Therefore, based on the IPS–panel unit root test, the series are integrated of order one, I(1).
Given these results, the panel cointegration test can be applied to test for the existence of
stable, long-run relationship among the variables.
Panel cointegration analysis
As shown in Table VI, at both constant and constant plus trend conditions, the panel and
group t and ADF statistics ( four of seven) reject the null hypothesis at 5 percent level of
significance. Hence, most of the statistics support the rejection of null hypothesis, an
indication of the existence of long-run relationship among the variables for the SSA
countries under consideration. The panel non-parametric (t-statistics) and parametric (ADF
statistics) are more reliable in constant plus trend condition (Pedroni, 1999). Therefore, the
results presented in Table VI can sufficiently lead to the conclusion that the variables of the
analysis have long-run relationship.
Panel coefficient estimation
Table VII presents the results of FMOLS and DOLS techniques employed in the long-run
coefficient estimation, while that of multicollinearity test is presented in Table VIII.
Level First-Difference
Variable Constant Constant+Trend Constant Constant+Trend
GDP 5.752 (1.000) 2.716 (0.997) −2.476** (0.007) −2.703** (0.003)
EXDBT 2.644 (0.996) 2.608 (0.996) −2.431** (0.008) −1.899** (0.029)
DEBTIN −1.175 (0.120) −0.242 (0.404) −6.321** (0.000) −5.598** (0.000)
GCF 3.893 (1.000) 1.898 (0.971) −2.197** (0.014) −1.658** (0.048)
CORR −0.620 (0.268) −0.313 (0.377) −4.110** (0.000) −2.863** (0.002)
Notes: The probability values are presented in the parentheses ( ). **Significant at 5 percent level, respectively
Table V.
Panel unit root test
Test Constant Constant+Trend
Panel v—statistic −1.702 −2.734
Panel ρ—statistic −0.062 0.674
Panel t—statistic (non-parametric) −10.870** −12.214**
Panel t—statistic (ADF): (parametric) −6.670** −6.965**
Group ρ—statistic 1.313 1.705
Group t—statistic (non-parametric) −7.888** −8.403**
Group t—statistic (ADF): (parametric) −3.344** −2.687**





EXDBT −0.521*** (0.000) −0.932** (0.041)
DEBTIN −4.600*** (0.000) −2.800*** (0.002)
CORR 2.400*** (0.000) 4.600*** (0.000)
GCF 5.178*** (0.000) 5.140*** (0.000)
Notes: Probability values are presented in parentheses ( ). **,***Indicate rejection of null hypothesis at 5 and










































Given the regression results in Table VII, EXDBT is statistically significant at 1 and
5 percent, and negatively related to GDP in both FMOLS and DOLS estimates.
The coefficient explains that US$1 increase in EXDBT results in the reduction in GDP by
(an average of ) US$0.73. This result is in line with the “Debt Overhang Hypothesis,”wherein
a continuous rise in debt accumulation reduces the level of investment and economic growth
as a result of increased tax on firms. Similar result was obtained by Eberhardt and
Presbitero (2015), Siddique et al. (2015) and Fosu (1999). This is possible, especially in view
of most African countries whose borrowings have only had the records of not being
properly channeled into productive activities and, most of the times, mismanaged.
The consequence of this is the loss of output arising from the fact that the existing
productive capital is depleted in financing the debts obligations, thereby reducing the level
of domestic investment and economic growth. Also, continuous debts may increase the
menace of capital flight. This arises when investors largely anticipate the likelihood that
they would be heavily taxed as governments struggle to meet the debts obligations. Thus,
they may consider short-term capital repatriation until the economic conditions improve and
become favorable to them, all with the resultant effect of reducing the economies’ output.
Similarly, the coefficient of DEBTIN shows that it is statistically significant at 1 percent
and explains a negative relationship between DEBTIN and GDP. This implies that a US$1
rise in interest (either by accumulation or higher cost of servicing) reduces the GDP by
(an average of ) US$3.70. This is in line with the studies conducted by Abdullahi et al. (2016)
and Mohd Dauda et al. (2013). This implies that interest payment on such debts have similar
effect on economic growth as external debt itself (in the selected countries). This is because,
interest payment usually compounds the actual repayment made on maturity of debts.
These countries have a long-term record of incurring higher debts, and the servicing of these
debt obligations have usually increased their share of recurrent expenditure on annual
budgets. This leaves very little share for capital expenditure and investment in productive
activities; hence, the reduction in productive capacity.
For GCF and GDP, the relationship is significant and positive. This explains that the
GDP rises by (an average of ) US$5.16 when GCF rises by US$1. Capital formation is
an increase in domestic stock of capital; and therefore, the relationship is in line with a
priori expectation.
Finally, the coefficient of CORR is found to be significant at 1 percent level of
significance, and positively related to the GDP. In general, a high level of CORR has adverse
effect on GDP as a consequence of loss of output. The result obtained in this study, however,
suggests that corruption enhances economic growth in the SSA countries under
consideration. This is in line with the research carried out by Coupet (2011), Huntington
(1968) and Leff (1964) and justified in view of the alarming rate of corruption in most of these
countries. Almost all forms of corruption, ranging from political to economic, have bedeviled
both the governance and economic systems.
In fact, even if the proceeds of corruption are not required immediately, both private and
public-sector players engage in any form that anticipates future rent-seeking activities. This is so













































For most of the services to be rendered, by both the civil and public servants, and for contracts to
be awarded, some monetary (and/or other) inducements are usually required against the
standards. The positive relationship obtained in this result in an attestation to the fact that public
services are most (well) rendered when some forms of inducements are made. Hence, this result
explains that corruption (in these countries) rather increases the level of production by about US
$3.50 for any point increase in the level of corruption in the forms of bribery, nepotism,
favoritism, among others.
The result of the multicollinearity test depicts absence of collinearity among the
independent variables and, therefore, there is low degree of substitutability among the
explanatory variables. This is in view of the fact that each of the values of the VIF is less
than 5 (Gujarati, 2004). As such, any policy implications on these results are rightly guided.
Panel Granger causality test
The results of the Granger causality test, employed to examine the direction of causality
among the variables of interest, are presented in Table IX. The results explain that there is
evidence of causality running from GDP through EXDBT and from EXDBT through
DEBTIN, each with a feedback. These show that there are bi-directional causalities between
GDP and EXDBT, as well as between EXDBT and DEBTIN since the probability value in
each case is less 5 percent. Similarly, while there is a uni-directional causality running from
GDP through CORR, there are independence between GDP and DEBTIN, EXDBT and
CORR and between CORR and DEBTIN.
5. Summary, conclusion and recommendation
The study examines the relationship among external debt, corruption and economic growth
in selected five SSA countries which are chosen based on the sizes of their economies and
the proportion of their external debt to that of the entire SSA countries. The study covers the
period from 1990 to 2015, using the corruption-adjusted augmented Solow and the two-gap
Excluded χ2 df Prob.
Dependent variable: GDP
EXDBT 6.038 2 0.049
DEBTIN 2.271 2 0.321
CORR 12.267 2 0.002
All 14.249 6 0.027
Dependent variable: EXDBT
GDP 6.866 2 0.032
DEBTIN 7.628 2 0.022
CORR 0.109 2 0.947
All 17.570 6 0.007
Dependent variable: DEBTIN
GDP 0.537 2 0.765
EXDBT 6.619 2 0.037
CORR 0.479 2 0.787
All 7.706 6 0.260
Dependent variable: CORR
GDP 1.478 2 0.478
EXDBT 1.388 2 0.500
DEBTIN 2.206 2 0.332










































theories, while employing the FMOLS technique and panel granger causality in estimating
the relationships.
Going by the results of the panel analysis, the rising level of external indebtedness in the
selected countries is alarming, considering that only the five countries’ estimated external
debt is about 47 percent of the total external debt of the 46 countries in SSA. This, therefore,
has the effect of crowding-out public investment as a result of debt servicing obligations.
It also results in capital flight since investors largely avoid the burdens of higher taxes.
In view of the negative consequences on the economy, the governments should address the
menace of the rising debt through the adoption of other sources of capital for investment.
Such include more openness of the economies for more capital, by easing the restrictions on
genuine imports and exports of valuable goods and services. This has the benefits of
increasing investment in the domestic economies and creating wealth, as government would
realize tax-revenues from imported capital, as against the payment of interest on external
debt. In addition, enhanced economic growth through investment will lead to technology
transfer into the domestic economies, with a maximum likelihood of creating employment
for citizens.
Similarly, the rising level of corruption in the selected SSA countries should be tackled
head-on. The level of corruption, being so rampant that public servants have seen
inducements before the performance of routine functions as a custom, has a severe impact
beyond the supposed increased level of output. Appropriate policy in this regard requires
making integrity and sincerity more attractive, while any act of corruption should be met
with severe penalties. Also, the various anti-corruption agencies of governments should be
made to perform independently and credibly. A situation where corruption attracts less
penalty than the illegal reward obtained would only make corruption largely attractive.
In doing this, proper orientation on the adverse effects of corruption should be extended to
the coming generations, so that they may be free from seeing corrupt acts as a means
to proper livelihood.
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